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CRIMINOLOGY 
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION, HIDDEN 
COSTS, AND THE DEATH PENALTY: THE 
CASE OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY 
NICHOLAS PETERSEN* AND MONA LYNCH**** 
This Article analyzes the processing of homicide cases in Los Angeles 
County from 1996 to 2008 to measure the time-costs of pursuing cases 
capitally and to examine how prosecutorial discretion in homicide charging 
is exercised in this jurisdiction.  To answer these questions, we explore two 
related outcomes: (1) the odds of a “death-notice” filing and (2) time-to-
resolution.  According to Model 1, death-eligible cases with multiple 
special circumstances are significantly more likely to be prosecuted 
capitally than those with only one special circumstance.  In light of the 
limited financial information regarding capital punishment at the county 
level, Models 2–4 utilize Cox Proportional Hazard regression to investigate 
the time-costs associated with death eligibility.1  Estimates indicate that 
capital cases take significantly longer to reach resolution than noncapital 
cases.  Furthermore, the filing of special circumstances increases survival 
time in noncapital cases.  In addition to highlighting the time-costs of trying 
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1 CAL. COMM’N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE (CCFAJ), REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN CALIFORNIA 34–43, 
77–84, 96–104 (June 30, 2008) [hereinafter CCFAJ], available at http://www.ccfaj.org/
documents/reports/dp/official/FINAL%20REPORT%20DEATH%20PENALTY.pdf; SUSAN 
S. EVERINGHAM, RAND CORP., Ser. No. CT 300, INVESTIGATING THE COSTS OF THE DEATH 
PENALTY IN CALIFORNIA: INSIGHTS FOR FUTURE DATA COLLECTION FROM A PRELIMINARY 
RAND EFFORT 1 (2008) (relating testimony before the Cal. Comm’n on the Fair Admin. of 
Justice on Feb. 20, 2008). 
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cases capitally, these findings reveal the time-costs associated with the 
prosecution of special circumstance cases, even when the death penalty is 
not ultimately sought.  By examining capital costs at the county level, this 
analysis contributes to the ongoing policy reform debate in California that 
aims to address the state’s “dysfunctional” death penalty system.2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On August 27, 2004, the California Commission on the Fair 
Administration of Justice (CCFAJ) was established by California State 
Senate Resolution Number 44 to conduct a comprehensive review of 
California’s criminal justice system.  The commission was charged with 
three overarching tasks: (1) examine past failures of the state’s criminal 
justice system, particularly wrongful convictions and executions; (2) review 
potential strategies for improving the criminal justice system, including 
adding safeguards against miscarriages of justice; and (3) propose 
legislative reforms that will improve fairness and justice in the state.3 
After four years of work, the CCFAJ published its final report in 2008.  
The bulk of the final report focused on issues facing the state’s capital 
punishment system, which the commission characterized as “broken” in 
terms of its economic costs, the quality of justice it affords, and the toll it 
takes on other aspects of criminal justice administration in the state.4  
Specifically, the report identified a range of flaws in the system, explored 
alternatives to capital punishment, and proposed legislative reforms.5  A 
key finding was that excessive delays and overbroad prosecutorial 
discretion plagued California’s death penalty system.6  Ultimately, though, 
the report indicated that due to serious gaps in data-collection efforts within 
the state, further research on the costs of capital punishment is necessary, 
particularly on pretrial and presentencing costs, in order to develop 
appropriate remedial policies.7 
This study attempts to answer the CCFAJ’s call for further research on 
the problems associated with California’s death penalty system at the trial 
level by examining the processing of homicide cases in one jurisdiction—
Los Angeles County—from 1996 to 2008.  We investigate the practices and 
 
2 CCFAJ, supra note 1, at 3, 6. 
3 Id. at 1. 
4 Id. at 4–7. 
5 Id. at 5–15.  See generally id. at 60–104 (discussing the financial and procedural 
implications of reforming California’s death penalty system by narrowing the list of special 
circumstances or replacing capital punishment with life in prison without the possibility of 
parole). 
6 Id. at 21–27, 102–04. 
7 Id. at 34–43, 77–84, 96–102. 
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patterns of prosecutorial discretion in homicide case processing in order to 
better understand the associated costs and consequences of the capital 
punishment system prior to final adjudication. 
In the next section, we provide a brief overview of the failures of 
California’s “modern” death penalty system,8 in part by describing in more 
detail the findings of the CCFAJ panel.  To contextualize these failures, we 
begin with a brief sketch of the mechanics of California’s homicide and 
capital sentencing laws and how they are typically applied in Los Angeles 
County, the site of our study.  We follow with a review of the death penalty 
cost literature, highlighting the ways in which methodological limitations 
may restrict the utility of existing estimates in notable ways.  Within this 
section, we specifically examine the role of prosecutorial discretion in 
seeking the death penalty and the potential economic and justice costs 
associated with the breadth of discretion afforded to prosecutors. 
Next, we provide an overview of our methodological framework used 
to estimate the time-costs of California’s capital punishment system at the 
county level.  Data on Los Angeles County homicide cases filed from 1996 
to 2008 were used to formulate multiple regression models predicting: (1) 
the odds of a “death-notice” filing and (2) time-to-resolution.  We conclude 
by addressing the public policy relevancy of our findings, as well as their 
implications for how criminal justice resources are allocated and for broader 
goals of justice.  Here, we place the California case within the context of the 
penological justifications for capital punishment, which have, in recent 
years, been challenged by the accumulation of countervailing empirical 
evidence indicating that the death penalty is ineffective as either a deterrent 
or a method of incapacitation.9 
 
8 The “modern” era of capital punishment refers to the post-Furman (1972) period when 
states redrafted their death penalty laws in an effort to reinstate capital punishment with 
constitutionally sound statutes that addressed the infirmities identified in Furman v. Georgia, 
408 U.S. 238 (1972).  Not all states that tried came up with constitutionally viable schemes 
initially; California’s first post-Furman statute was found unconstitutional.  Steven F. Shatz 
& Nina Rivkind, The California Death Penalty Scheme: Requiem for Furman?, 72 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1283, 1307–10 (1997).  The core of the current statute was put into effect in 1978 as a 
result of a voter initiative.  See id. at 1310–17.  See generally CCFAJ at 17–18 (discussing 
the history of California’s “modern” death penalty statute, particularly the broadening of 
death eligibility over time). 
9 Jeffrey Fagan & Valerie West, Death and Deterrence Redux: Science, Law and Causal 
Reasoning on Capital Punishment, in THE FUTURE OF AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY: AN 
AGENDA FOR THE NEXT GENERATION OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT RESEARCH  311, 342 (Charles 
S. Lanier et al. eds., 2009) [hereinafter THE FUTURE OF AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY]; 
Michael L. Radelet, The Executioner’s Waning Defenses, in THE ROAD TO ABOLITION?: THE 
FUTURE OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 19, 24 (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & 
Austin Sarat eds., 2009).  
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A. THE FAILURES OF CALIFORNIA’S DEATH PENALTY SYSTEM 
In California, criminal homicides are divided into two categories—
manslaughter and murder.  Manslaughter, which can take several different 
forms, is defined as the “unlawful killing of a human being without 
malice.”10  Murder is defined as “the unlawful killing of a human being, or 
a fetus, with malice aforethought.”11  Varying degrees of murder are 
distinguished based on the presence or absence of premeditation.  First-
degree murder consists of premeditated killings or killings in the course of a 
specified felony, and only first-degree murders that involve at least one of 
the twenty-two special circumstance allegations (which themselves have 
numerous subcategories of eligibility) enumerated in California Penal Code 
(PC) §190.2 qualify for the death penalty.12  Thus, a special circumstance 
allegation requires an accompanying charge of first-degree murder. 
The criminal justice processing of homicides begins when a killing is 
reported to the police.13  Once a homicide is “cleared by arrest,” it is 
eligible for prosecution.  A homicide is considered to be “cleared by arrest 
or solved, for crime reporting purposes, when at least one person is arrested, 
charged with the commission of an offense, and turned over to a court for 
prosecution.”14  The district attorney’s (DA) office then decides whether or 
not charges will be filed.  The decision to file criminal charges shapes the 
course of the case in fundamental ways, setting in motion a series of 
criminal proceedings. 
In Los Angeles County, a deputy DA makes the initial charging 
decisions.15  If the deputy DA charges the defendant(s) with first-degree 
murder and at least one special circumstance allegation, the case becomes 
potentially death eligible.16     
 
10 CAL. PENAL CODE § 192 (West 2008). 
11 PENAL § 187(a). 
12 PENAL § 190.2; Shiva Shirazi Davoudian, California Homicide Law: The Basics, 36 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1371, 1391 (2003). 
13 See infra Figure 1. 
14 CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HOMICIDE IN CALIFORNIA 2010, at 50 (2010), available at 
http://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/pdfs/cjsc/publications/homicide/hm10/preface.pdf. 
15 Letter from Natasha Minsker, Death Penalty Director, Am. Civil Liberties Union of 
Northern Cal., to John Van de Kamp, Chair, Cal. Comm’n on the Fair Admin. of Justice 
(Feb. 15, 2008) [hereinafter Letter from Natasha Minsker], available at http://ccfaj.org/
documents/reports/dp/expert/ACLUDAChargingPracticesLetter.pdf. 
16 As used here, “death eligible” refers to a case involving at least one special 
circumstance allegation, but not necessarily involving the filing of a death notice.  
Throughout this paper, the term death eligible refers to all cases involving a special 
circumstance (both capital and noncapital) unless otherwise specified.  A “capital case” or 
“death penalty case” refers to one in which both a special circumstance allegation and a 
death notice have been filed.  The term “special circumstance case” applies to cases 
involving one or more special circumstances, but no death notice.  “Non-special 
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Figure 117 
Processing of Homicide Cases in Los Angeles County 
Homicide Reported 
        Homicide is “cleared by arrest” 
        Homicide is not solved or “cleared exceptionally” 
Charges Filed by Deputy DA 
        Homicide Charges Filed 
                First-degree murder charged† 
                Second-degree murder or lesser offense charged* 
        Special Circumstance Allegations 
                Special circumstance(s) are filed‡ 
                No special circumstance(s) are filed* 
Preliminary Hearing 
        Death notice is filed‡ 
        No death notice is filed* 
Case Disposition 
        Trial‡ 
        Plea Bargain* 
        Dismissal* 
Verdict at Guilt Trial 
        Guilty of first-degree murder and at least one special circumstance‡ 
        Not guilty of first-degree murder or at least one special  
        circumstance* 
Sentence at Penalty Trial 
        Life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) 
        Death sentence 
Legend: *non-death-eligible case; †potentially death-eligible case; 
‡death-eligible case. 
 
Upon completion of a preliminary hearing, the “special circumstance 
committee” recommends whether or not a death notice should be filed.  The 
special circumstance committee chair reviews this recommendation and 
 
circumstance case” refers to a case without any special circumstance allegation. 
17 The information contained in Figure 1 can be found at: David Baldus et al., 
Perspectives, Approaches, and Future Directions in Death Penalty Proportionality Studies, 
in THE FUTURE OF AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY, supra note 9, at 135, 136 fig.1; H. MITCHELL 
CALDWELL ET AL., DEATH PENALTY SURVEY REPORT 5–7 (2007), available at http://www.
ccfaj.org/documents/reports/dp/expert/Pepperdine-CaldwellResearch.pdf; LINDA E. CARTER 
ET AL., UNDERSTANDING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT LAW 95–103 (2008); Philip J. Cook, Potential 
Savings from Abolition of the Death Penalty in North Carolina, 11 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 
498, 513 fig.3 (2009); Letter from Natasha Minsker, supra note 15, at 5 (Chart 1), 8 (Chart 
2). 
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makes a final determination as to whether or not the death penalty will be 
sought. 
At any point during this process, the prosecution may offer the defense 
a plea agreement.  If the defense agrees to a negotiated plea, the case results 
in a guilty plea to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) or a lesser 
sentence. 
If no plea bargain is offered or an agreement is not reached, the case 
proceeds to trial.  Capital trials are bifurcated, consisting of a guilt phase 
and a penalty phase.  In order to advance to a penalty trial and qualify for 
the death penalty, the jury must find the defendant(s) guilty of both first-
degree murder and at least one special circumstance allegation during the 
guilt phase.  At the penalty trial, jurors hear case-specific aggravating and 
mitigating evidence before receiving instructions on the process that should 
be used to weigh that evidence when rendering a sentence of death or 
LWOP.18 
The current scheme for selecting death-eligible murders from the 
larger category of first-degree murders was originally authorized in 1978, 
when California voters passed the so-called Briggs Death Penalty Initiative 
Act.  State senator John Briggs, who was one of the initiative’s authors, 
touted the law as the “toughest” death penalty law in the nation.19  It 
derived most of its “toughness” from its very broad definitions of the types 
of murder that would be eligible for capital prosecution.20 
While both state and federal appeals courts have held that California’s 
death penalty statute is constitutional, its application since first being put 
into practice has been anything but ideal.  Indeed, it has been called, by no 
less than a federal circuit court judge, a multibillion dollar “debacle” and 
“fraud” perpetrated on California taxpayers.21  Since 1978, prosecutors in 
the state have sought thousands of death sentences, hundreds of capitally 
charged defendants have been sent to death row, and thirteen executions 
have been carried out.  As of mid-year 2012, 725 condemned persons 
populated the state’s overcrowded and decrepit death row,22 yet executions 
remain on hold in the state as the latest lethal injection protocol has been 
 
18 Steven F. Shatz, The Eighth Amendment, the Death Penalty, and Ordinary Robbery-
Burglary Murderers: A California Case Study, 59 FLA. L. REV. 719, 724 (2007). 
19 Id. at 728. 
20 Id. at 729. 
21 Judge Arthur L. Alarcón & Paula M. Mitchell, Executing the Will of the Voters?: A 
Roadmap to Mend or End the California Legislature’s Multi-Billion-Dollar Death Penalty 
Debacle, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. S41, S41 (2011). 
22 CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., DEATH ROW TRACKING SYSTEM: CONDEMNED INMATE 
LIST (SECURE) (July 2, 2012) [hereinafter CONDEMNED INMATE LIST], available at 
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Capital_Punishment/docs/CondemnedInmateListSecure.pdf. 
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deemed unconstitutional by a state court judge.23  The average time from 
judgment to execution in California is seventeen years and growing longer 
annually; this wait is well above the national average.24 
At the core of many of California’s problems with the death penalty is 
the breadth of the original sentencing statute, which has only grown broader 
since 1978.25  In 1997, Shatz and Rivkind raised the question of whether 
California’s statute adequately narrowed the pool of death-eligible cases, as 
was mandated in Furman v. Georgia.26  Their analysis of case facts in a 
sample of California homicide convictions appealed from 1988 to 1992 
indicated that seven out of every eight noncapital first-degree murder cases 
would factually qualify for the death penalty under California’s statute, 
thereby rendering the state’s death-eligibility criterion even more arbitrary 
and capricious than the one deemed unconstitutional prior to Furman.27  
They did a closer examination of all first- and second-degree murder 
convictions in three California counties, and found a similar proportion of 
cases that would be death eligible under the statute.28 
Beyond this justice concern with California’s statute, another 
consequence of having an overbroad “narrowing” scheme is that 
prosecutors’ charging power is thereby increased.  Special circumstances 
can be filed in most first-degree murder cases in order to leverage guilty 
pleas;29 overzealous prosecutors can actively seek the death penalty in cases 
that would not warrant such action in other counties, thus creating 
interjurisdictional disparities;30 extralegal factors, such as defendant and 
victim demographic characteristics, as well as political pressures, can more 
 
23 Carol J. Williams, New Lethal Injection Rules Tossed, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2011, at 
AA1. 
24 CCFAJ, supra note 1, at 22.  See generally id. at 21–27 (reviewing empirical findings 
regarding delays in California’s death penalty system). 
25 Shatz, supra note 18, at 728; Shatz & Rivkind, supra note 8, at 1326, 1339–41. 
26 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239 (1972). 
27 In Zant v. Stephens, the Court noted that aggravating circumstances should narrow the 
pool of death-eligible defendants; yet aggravating circumstances do not necessarily need to 
guide juror discretion at the sentencing stage.  462 U.S. 862, 877–78 (1983); Chelsea Creo 
Sharon, The ‘Most Deserving’ of Death: The Narrowing Requirement and the Proliferation 
of Aggravating Factors in Capital Sentencing Statutes, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L L. REV. 223, 230 
(2011). 
28 Shatz & Rivkind, supra note 8, at 1334–35. 
29 Susan Ehrhard, Plea Bargaining and the Death Penalty: An Exploratory Study, 29 
JUST. SYS. J. 313, 314 (2008). 
30 CALDWELL ET AL., supra note 17, at 5–6; ELLEN S. KREITZBERG, CAL. COMM’N ON THE 
FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES IN CALIFORNIA DEATH 
PENALTY CASES (2008), available at http://www.ccfaj.org/documents/reports/dp/expert/
Kreitzberg.pdf; Letter from Natasha Minsker, supra note 15. 
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easily creep into the decisionmaking process;31 and local jurisdictions can 
suffer the resource drains caused by increased threats of a death-notice 
filing, which leads to dramatically higher case expenses.32 
One way that these resource costs materialize is in case delays and 
lengthy time-to-resolution.  Indeed, the CCFAJ report noted that capital 
cases likely take longer to reach resolution than noncapital cases since they 
require more preparation, but the Commission could only speculate about 
the specific preconviction time-costs: 
The decision to seek the death penalty in a pending murder prosecution triggers a 
number of consequences that affect the duration, complexity and cost of the trial 
proceedings.  Death penalty trials clearly take longer and cost more than murder trials 
in which the death penalty is not sought. Unfortunately, we have only a rough 
estimate of how many death penalty trials are taking place each year in California.33 
Attorney salaries represent a large portion of the costs associated with 
capital punishment at the county level, yet prosecutors and defense 
attorneys are not required to keep track of their expenses.34  Moreover, 
county-level attorneys report that “there is no such thing as a typical 
homicide case,” thereby making cost estimates based on officials’ “best 
guess” of “average” homicide cases subject to measurement error.35  State-
level costs are equally difficult to estimate since the California Supreme 
Court does not maintain records on the time dedicated to the handling of 
 
31 Catherine Lee, Hispanics and the Death Penalty: Discriminatory Charging Practices 
in San Joaquin County, California, 35 J. CRIM. JUST. 17, 21 (2007); Glenn L. Pierce & 
Michael L. Radelet, The Impact of Legally Inappropriate Factors on Death Sentencing for 
California Homicides, 1990–1999, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 19–36 (2005) [hereinafter 
The Impact of Legally Inappropriate Factors]; Robert E. Weiss et al., Assessing the 
Capriciousness of Death Penalty Charging, 30 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 607, 611 (1996); Robert 
Weiss et al., Death Penalty Charging in Los Angeles County: An Illustrative Data Analysis 
Using Skeptical Priors, 28 SOC. METHODS & RES. 91, 114 (1999). 
32 Katherine Baicker, The Budgetary Repercussions of Capital Convictions, 4 ADVANCES 
ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y 1, 3, 10, 13 (2004); Ashley Rupp, Death Penalty Prosecutorial 
Charging Decisions and County Budgetary Restrictions: Is the Death Penalty Arbitrarily 
Applied Based on County Funding?, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2735, 2752, 2758–61 (2002). 
33 CCFAJ, supra note 1, at 34.  In 2006, the CCFAJ hired the RAND Corporation to 
evaluate whether or not it was possible to estimate accurately the costs associated with 
California’s capital punishment system.  EVERINGHAM, supra note 1, at 1, 6–8.  Criminal 
justice officials at the state and county levels were interviewed in an effort to gauge the 
availability of financial data on California capital cases.  Id.  Based on these interviews, 
RAND concluded that it was unfeasible to calculate costs due to the lack of readily available 
financial information.  Id. 
34 Id. at 5; NATASHA MINSKER, ACLU OF N. CAL., THE HIDDEN DEATH TAX: THE SECRET 
COSTS OF SEEKING EXECUTION IN CALIFORNIA 39 (2012) [hereinafter THE HIDDEN DEATH 
TAX], available at http://www.aclunc.org/docs/criminal_justice/death_penalty/the_hidden_
death_tax.pdf. 
35 EVERINGHAM, supra note 1, at 5. 
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capital versus noncapital cases. 
In the end, the CCFAJ was only able to offer rough estimates of capital 
punishment costs in California.  The Commission estimated that California 
currently spends $137.7 million on death-penalty-related costs each year.36  
This estimate was divided into pretrial and trial costs at $20 million 
annually, $54.4 million each year for the cost of state-level appeal and 
habeas proceedings, and confinement costs at $63.3 million annually.  The 
Commission was unable to calculate the costs of federal habeas corpus 
proceedings.37 
The CCFAJ panel also raised the issue of overbroad charging practices 
as a contributory factor in the system’s failures.  However, the panel was 
unable to systematically examine patterns in special circumstance filings 
throughout California, as there is no statewide database of prosecutorial 
charging decisions, or any mandate or mechanism for data collection 
whatsoever.38  As such, the panel was forced to rely on studies that 
examined the special circumstance allegations filed only against current 
death-row inmates, or ones that looked at special circumstance filings in 
just a limited number of jurisdictions.39 
After reviewing these and other findings, the CCFAJ panel pinpointed 
the “felony-murder” special circumstance as particularly problematic and 
recommended that the legislature remove felony-murder from the list of 
special circumstance allegations.40  Indeed, the report suggested limiting 
death eligibility to five crime types: (1) murder of a law-enforcement 
officer; (2) murders occurring at correctional facilities; (3) multiple 
murders; (4) murders involving excessive torture; and (5) murder of 
witnesses, jurors, judges, prosecutors, and investigators.41  Its concerns with 
the felony-murder special circumstance were empirically justified: Shatz 
found that while a large proportion of death sentences were sought in 
felony-murder cases, the rate of obtaining death sentences was 
exceptionally low (higher only than for “lying in wait”).42  For the most 
common felony-murder cases—burglary-murder and robbery-murder—the 
death sentence rate was a mere 5%.43 
 
36 CCFAJ, supra note 1, at 10, 83–84. 
37 Alarcón & Mitchell, supra note 21, at S109–S110; see also CCFAJ, supra note 1, at 
84 (providing state, but not federal, habeas costs). 
38 CCFAJ, supra note 1, at 96–101. 
39 Id. at 64.  See generally id. at 60–77 (reviewing studies examining special 
circumstances filed against defendants sentenced to death in California). 
40 Id. at 62. 
41 Id. at 61–62. 
42 Shatz, supra note 18, at 745. 
43 Id. 
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The Commission also analyzed three potential remedies to fix the 
current capital punishment system, and considered the relative costs and/or 
savings of each.  First, it suggested that legislative reforms to the current 
system aimed at improving justice would cost an additional $95 million, 
bringing the total annual rate to $232.7 million.44  The option of narrowing 
death eligibility to the five types of special circumstance allegations listed 
above was estimated to potentially lower the annual cost of the death 
penalty to $130 million.45  Finally, the option of replacing the death penalty 
with a system of LWOP would bring down annual costs to an estimated 
$11.5 million.46  The Commission again qualified all of these estimates, 
stating that “it is impossible to ascertain the precise costs of the 
administration of California’s death penalty law at this time.  But the 
choices that California faces require some comparison of projected costs; 
for this purpose, rough estimates will have to do.”47 
In order to assess the costs associated with capital cases and other 
related policy concerns, the panel called for the establishment of a statewide 
data-collection system.48  It was recommended that the state legislature 
impose requirements on courts, prosecutors, and defense attorneys to collect 
information on special circumstance filings, death-notice filings, and case 
dispositions (e.g., dismissal, plea, verdict, etc.).49  It was further proposed 
that the state formulate a “Death Penalty Review Panel” composed of 
various criminal justice officials to review California’s death penalty 
system on an annual basis.50 
Despite the clear message conveyed in the CCFAJ report, the 
California legislature has remained recalcitrant on the issue of the death 
penalty, making it “clear that the future of California’s death penalty is now 
up to the voters.”51  California Chief Justice Tani Cantil-Sakauye conveyed 
a similar sentiment when asked about the future of the state’s death penalty 
system: “That really is up to the voters or to the Legislature . . . .”52  As a 
result of the legislature’s unwillingness and/or inability to implement 
reforms—even just those that would allow accurate data collection—a 
measure (Proposition 34) was placed on the November 2012 ballot allowing 
 
44 CCFAJ, supra note 1, at 10, 83–84. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 77. 
48 Id. at 13, 94. 
49 Id. at 14, 102. 
50 Id. at 13, 102. 
51 Alarcón & Mitchell, supra note 21, at S47–S48. 
52 Maura Doland, State’s Death Penalty Not ‘Working,’ L.A. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2011, at 
A1. 
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California voters to determine the future of the state’s death penalty system.  
Senator Hancock, Proposition 34’s founder, largely marketed the measure 
as a cost-saving initiative, claiming that it would save the state millions of 
dollars annually, much of which would be redirected to other public-safety 
efforts.53 
B. WHAT DOES THE DEATH PENALTY COST? 
In Gregg v. Georgia, the Supreme Court underscored the uniqueness 
of capital cases by explicating the “death is different” doctrine.54  This 
doctrine requires the implementation of numerous procedural safeguards in 
capital cases to ensure that constitutional standards are achieved.  Nearly 
three decades of scholarship indicate that the procedural safeguards 
implemented in capital cases make them cost significantly more than 
noncapital murder cases.55  Yet even with the current level of safeguards in 
place, miscarriages of justice persist.56  Indeed, the decision to seek the 
death penalty fundamentally alters the course of an “average” homicide 
case, setting in motion an entire chain of events that requires the allocation 
of extra resources at the county and state levels, even if the case ultimately 
results in a sentence less than death.57 
At the pretrial and trial stages, capital cases involve a number of 
unique procedures, including, ideally, the appointment of specialized and 
experienced attorneys—generally two per case; the investigation of a 
defendant’s life history, which often requires the use of expert consultants; 
individualized juror “death-qualification” voir dire in addition to standard 
voir dire; and a two-part trial consisting of a guilt phase and a punishment 
phase.58  In addition, the state incurs a number of postconviction costs in 
death sentence cases due the complex appeal process, which typically 
involves three avenues for redress, and can raise issues from both the guilt 
and penalty phases of the trial.  There is an automatic direct appeal (which 
 
53 California Legislative Hearings: Assembly Appropriations Committee (4 of 5), THE 
CAL. CHANNEL (Aug. 17, 2011) [hereinafter California Legislative Hearings], 
http://www.calchannel.com/legacy-archive/ (search Archive 01/2009–03/2012 for “assembly 
appropriations committee” and select the hyperlink with video title “Assembly 
Appropriations Committee (4 of 5)” and date “08/17/2011”). 
54 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976). 
55 Jonathan E. Gradess & Andrew L. B. Davies, The Cost of the Death Penalty in 
America: Directions for Future Research, in THE FUTURE OF AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY, 
supra note 9, at 397, 398. 
56 JAMES S. LIEBMAN ET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM: ERROR RATES IN CAPITAL CASES, 1973–
1995, at 3 (2000); JAMES S. LIEBMAN ET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM, PART II: WHY THERE IS SO 
MUCH ERROR IN CAPITAL CASES, AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT 5–7 (2002). 
57 Letter from Natasha Minsker, supra note 15, at 8. 
58 Gradess & Davies, supra note 55, at 398. 
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in California is directly to the California Supreme Court), as well as 
opportunities to file habeas corpus petitions at the state and federal levels, 
which again require considerable expertise and resources.59  The costs of 
housing the condemned on death row are also susbtantially higher than they 
are for general-population prisoners, due to security needs and related 
expenses.60  In additon, the infrastructure costs associated with the 
functioning of the courts, including the salaries of court officials (e.g., 
attorneys, judges, etc.) is significantly increased by the existence of the 
death penalty caseload.61 
In the mid-1980s, the cost of trying a California capital case was an 
estimated $201,510 more than a noncapital trial, excluding pretrial or 
appeal costs.62  An article in the Sacramento Bee from that time period 
estimated that California would save an estimated $90 million annually if 
capital punishment were abolished.63  More recent estimates published by 
Alarcón and Mitchell indicate that a total of about $4 billion has been spent 
by the state and federal governments on California death penalty cases from 
1978 to 2010.64  This $4 billion figure includes pretrial, trial, appellate, and 
incarceration costs; nearly half was attributable to presentencing costs 
incurred at the county level.65 
Although these kinds of cost-comparison studies are enlightening, they 
often suffer from several methodological limitations, including: small 
sample sizes, omitted variable bias, selection bias, and narrow periods of 
analysis.66  These analyses usually derive financial estimates by 
extrapolating costs associated with a small sample of “typical” or “average” 
death penalty cases to the entire universe of death penalty or death-eligible 
cases.  They then compare the total costs of death penalty cases versus non-
death penalty cases rather than statistically controlling for additional factors 
that may affect the cost differential between these types of cases (e.g., 
 
59 CCFAJ, supra note 1, at 21. 
60 Id. at 69–70. 
61 Gradess & Davies, supra note 55, at 406–08 (discussing infrastructure costs).  See 
generally id. at 399–406 (discussing the death penalty infrastructure costs that are incurred at 
the local level, even when cases are not prosecuted capitally). 
62 Margot Garey, The Cost of Taking a Life: Dollars and Sense of the Death Penalty, 18 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1222, 1221 (1985). 
63 Stephen Magagnini, Closing Death Row Would Save State $90 Million a Year, 
SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 28, 1988, at A1. 
64 Alarcón & Mitchell, supra note 21, at S41. 
65 Id. at 62. 
66 John K. Roman et al., Reassessing the Cost of the Death Penalty Using Quasi-
Experimental Methods: Evidence from Maryland, 11 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 530, 531 (2009) 
[hereinafter Reassessing the Cost of the Death Penalty]. 
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number of defendants, seriousness of the crime, etc.).67  Failing to control 
for additional cost-related factors may artificially inflate cost estimates due 
to omitted variable bias.  In other words, cost differences that may actually 
stem from other case factors (e.g., number of defendants, offense severity, 
etc.) are attributed to the filing of a death notice because these important 
covariates are not estimated.68  These models also suffer from selection bias 
since they focus on a small sample of death penalty cases rather than the 
full universe of homicide cases.69 
In recent years, more sophisticated studies looking at various death 
penalty jurisdictions have attempted to overcome these methodological 
shortcomings by utilizing multiple regression and quasi-experimental 
techniques.  Cook et al.’s study of North Carolina capital cases represents 
one of the first attempts to calculate the costs associated with each 
component of the death penalty system through the use of multiple 
regression techniques.70  Results indicate that a capital trial at that time cost 
an estimated $147,700 more than a noncapital trial in that jurisdiction.71  
Cook conducted a follow-up study, also in North Carolina, which employed 
counterfactual logic to estimate the potential economic effect of abolition in 
that state.72  His findings suggested that the state would have saved an 
estimated $11 million annually if capital punishment had been abolished in 
July 2004.73 
Using a slightly different approach, Roman et al. attempted to control 
for selection effects resulting from prosecutorial charging decisions by 
analyzing the full universe of death-eligible murder cases in Maryland from 
1978 to 1999 within a quasi-experimental framework.74  Propensity scores 
were used to match capital and noncapital murders along a number of case-
level characteristics in order to model the costs associated with the decision 
 
67 JOHN K. ROMAN ET AL., URBAN INST., RESEARCH REPORT: THE COST OF THE DEATH 
PENALTY IN MARYLAND 534–35 (2008) [hereinafter RESEARCH REPORT], available at 
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411625_md_death_penalty.pdf. 
68 JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, INTRODUCTORY ECONOMETRICS: A MODERN APPROACH 95–
99 (3d ed. 2006) (discussing omitted variable bias in social science research more generally). 
69 Gradess & Davies, supra note 55, at 397; ROMAN ET AL., RESEARCH REPORT, supra 
note 67, at 531. 
70 PHILIP J. COOK ET AL., TERRY SANFORD INST. OF PUB. POL’Y, DUKE UNIV., THE COSTS 
OF PROCESSING MURDER CASES IN NORTH CAROLINA (2012), available at http://www.goccp. 
maryland.gov/capital-punishment/documents/cook-materials.pdf. 
71 Id. at 2–3. 
72 Philip J. Cook, Potential Savings from Abolition of the Death Penalty in North 
Carolina, 11 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 498 (2009) [hereinafter Potential Savings]. 
73 Id. at 499. 
74 See ROMAN ET AL., RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 67, at 533; Roman et al., 
Reassessing the Cost of the Death Penalty, supra note 66, at 530. 
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to seek the death penalty.75  Upon successful completion of propensity-
score matching, the researchers estimated a series of regression equations 
corresponding to various stages of the capital punishment process.76  
Results from two-sampled t-tests indicated that capital cases involve 
significantly longer hearings and trials at the guilt phase and in 
postconviction appeal proceedings.77  Moreover, capital cases have 
significantly more postconviction appeals.78  An Ordinary Least Squares 
regression model was then used to evaluate the cost differential between 
capital and noncapital cases.79  Coefficients indicate that the trial and 
appellate review process is significantly more costly for capital cases 
compared to noncapital cases.80 
While the extant death penalty cost literature has effectively helped to 
dispel the popular myth that capital punishment is cheaper than LWOP, it 
remains limited in several respects.81  Only five out of the fourteen cost 
studies reviewed by Roman et al. compared death-eligible (i.e., capital and 
special circumstance cases) to non-death-eligible cases at the county level, 
and none of those utilized multiple regression techniques.82  To date, 
Roman et al.’s analysis83 of Maryland’s death penalty system is the only 
multiple regression study at the county level. 
Nonetheless, what is clear from the existing cost literature is that 
additional expenses begin to accrue as soon as the decision to seek death is 
made by the prosecutor.  As noted above, under California’s scheme, the 
filing of one or more special circumstance allegations fundamentally alters 
the course of a homicide case by making it death eligible.84  As a result, a 
large portion of the county-level costs associated with the death penalty are 
put in motion by those charging decisions. 
 
75 Roman et al., Reassessing the Cost of the Death Penalty, supra note 66, at 533. 
76 Id. at 554. 
77 Id. at 562. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 551. 
80 Id. at 569–70. 
81 See Gradess & Davies, supra note 55, at 397, 411. 
82 Roman et al., Reassessing the Cost of the Death Penalty, supra note 66, at 535; see 
also, e.g., STATE OF KAN. LEGISLATIVE DIV. OF POST AUDIT, COSTS INCURRED FOR DEATH 
PENALTY CASES: A K-GOAL AUDIT OF THE DEP’T OF CORR. (2012), available at 
http://www.kslpa.org/docs/reports/04pa03a.pdf; JOHN G. MORGAN ET AL., TENN. 
COMPTROLLER OF THE TREASURY, TENNESSEE’S DEATH PENALTY’S COSTS AND 
CONSEQUENCES (2012), available at http://www.comptroller1.state.tn.us/repository/RE/
deathpenalty.pdf; COOK ET AL., THE COSTS OF PROCESSING MURDER CASES IN NORTH 
CAROLINA, supra note 70; Cook, Potential Savings, supra note 72, at 24–25. 
83 See ROMAN ET AL., RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 67; Roman et al., Reassessing the 
Cost of the Death Penalty, supra note 66. 
84 See supra Table 1. 
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Once the DA’s office decides to file a death notice, the costs of 
proceeding continue to mount.  Because in such cases the defense must 
prepare not only for the guilt phase, but also for a penalty phase, the 
American Bar Association recommends that a four-member defense team 
consisting of two attorneys and two investigators be assigned to each capital 
case.85  As the case proceeds to trial, the requirement that a death-qualified 
jury be seated in a capital case means that extensive voir dire must be 
performed to ensure that any potential juror is excluded from the capital 
case if his death penalty attitude could “prevent or substantially impair the 
performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and 
his oath.”86 
The Supreme Court has also ruled that defense attorneys are entitled to 
present information regarding the defendant’s life history to capital jurors 
before they determine whether or not death is an appropriate punishment.87  
As a result, defense attorneys devote a considerable amount of resources to 
the preparation of a defendant’s life history, which often includes hiring a 
range of expert witnesses who can testify about elements of the life 
history.88  While these procedures are necessary for ensuring that 
constitutional requirements are achieved, they make capital cases 
significantly more costly than noncapital cases. 
In the case of California, data limitations, in part due to the absence of 
a comprehensive system for tracking county-level data, have stifled efforts 
to calculate with precision these pre-adjudication costs of capital 
punishment.89  Accordingly, researchers have had to calculate costs using 
several sources, some of which vary in accuracy and comprehensiveness.  
Erickson’s comparative analysis of “middle range” death-eligible cases 
from Los Angeles County provides one of the most comprehensive 
tabulations of capital punishment trial costs in California.90  Erickson 
 
85 MINSKER, THE HIDDEN DEATH TAX, supra note 34, at 7; see also CCFAJ, supra note 1, 
at 42–43. 
86 Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 420 (1985) (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 
45 (1980)); see also Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522–23 (1968).  
87 See CARTER ET AL., UNDERSTANDING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT LAW, supra note 17, at 
132; Craig Haney, The Social Context of Capital Murder: Social Histories and the Logic of 
Mitigation, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 547, 559 (1994) [hereinafter The Social Context of 
Capital Murder]. 
88 COOK ET AL., THE COSTS OF PROCESSING MURDER CASES IN NORTH CAROLINA, supra 
note 70, at 11, 33–43, 44–60.  See generally Emily Hughes, Arbitrary Death: An Empirical 
Study of Mitigation, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 581 (2012) (discussing ABA guidelines for 
mitigation investigation and the significant weight given to using mitigation specialists in 
capital cases). 
89 EVERINGHAM, supra note 1, at 1, 6–8. 
90 David Erickson, Capital Punishment at What Price: An Analysis of the Cost Issue in a 
Strategy to Abolish the Death Penalty 19–26 (1993) (master’s thesis, University of 
1248 NICHOLAS PETERSEN & MONA LYNCH [Vol. 102 
calculated the costs of capital punishment by compiling financial 
information from a variety of criminal justice agencies using a sample of 
nineteen “typical” death-eligible cases involving one or more special 
circumstance allegations.91  In the early 1990s, capital cases were estimated 
to cost $1.2 million more than comparable noncapital death-eligible cases.92  
A detailed breakdown of these specific costs throughout the various stages 
of the capital punishment process vividly reveals the financial burden that 
capital cases place on county-level criminal justice systems.  At the pretrial 
stage, the cost differential stems from death qualification of a jury and 
defense attorney appointments.93  The prolonged process of death 
qualification costs the county an additional $56,706 per case compared to 
the noncapital jury-selection procedure.94  The complexity of capital cases 
requires the appointment of specialized defense attorneys at a rate of about 
$324,665 per case compared to a rate of $78,273 per noncapital case.95  
Comparable estimates for the salary costs of prosecutors, investigators, and 
expert witnesses could not be calculated.  The number of days spent in 
court is another source of disparity.  On average, death penalty cases 
involve 120 more court days than noncapital cases, at a rate of $3,589 per 
court day.96 
C. THE COST–DISCRETION NEXUS 
Because prosecutorial discretion in filing special circumstances is so 
vast in California (in that approximately 87% of first-degree murder cases 
meet the criteria for one or more special circumstances), the pretrial and 
trial costs may well exceed most other death penalty jurisdictions.97  A 
related consequence of the broad statute is that the threat of capital 
punishment is much more widespread in California, thus providing a 
powerful, albeit expensive, tool in the prosecutor’s arsenal. 
It appears that a few special circumstance allegations, in particular, 
account for the majority of death-eligible homicides in the state.  The 
 
California, Berkeley), available at http://www.deathpenalty.org/downloads/Erickson1993
COSTSTUDY.pdf. 
91 Id. at 38–39. 
92 Id. at 3. 
93 Id. at 21–22. 
94 Id. at 21.  The enhanced cost of death qualification is $56,706 per case (the difference 
between $68,909 for jury selection in death penalty cases versus $12,203 for non-death 
penalty cases). 
95 Id. at 22. 
96 Id. at 21. 
97 See CCFAJ, supra note 1, at 18; Shatz & Rivkind, supra note 8, at 1331. 
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felony-murder special circumstance98 was found in the vast majority of 
death penalty cases prosecuted in Alameda County99 and in those appealed 
statewide.100  In addition, felony-murder was the most common special 
circumstance filed against death row inmates from 1997 to 2007.101  
Felony-murder and other overbroad special circumstances increase the 
chances of racial bias and error by bolstering prosecutorial discretion.102  
For instance, Radelet and Pierce’s analysis of charges filed in Florida 
homicide cases between 1973 and 1977 indicates that black defendants 
accused of killing whites are significantly more likely to have their crime 
“upgraded” from non-felony-murder to felony-murder than other 
defendant–victim racial combinations.103 
Adding to the problem is that despite California’s overbroad death-
eligibility scheme, there is no statutory requirement that prosecutors 
indicate whether or not they intend to file a death notice.104  Nonetheless, 
under California Rule of the Court 8.613(b), prosecutors are presumed to be 
seeking the death penalty in special circumstance cases unless the DA’s 
office formally indicates otherwise,105 so defense attorneys are required to 
prepare these cases for capital litigation. 
Prior research has largely overlooked the influence of overbroad 
charging practices on cost outcomes.  The few studies that have examined 
costs at the county level mainly focused on the differential between capital 
and special circumstance cases, ignoring differences between special 
circumstance and non-special circumstance cases.  The paucity of research 
on this topic has significant policy implications given Roman et al.’s 
finding that attorneys spend a substantial amount of time and energy 
preparing death-eligible cases for capital litigation in which the death 
penalty is not ultimately sought.106 
Because prosecutors often seek to maximize conviction rates when 
making charging decisions,107 they may use special circumstance filings as 
 
98 CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(17) (West 2008). 
99 Shatz & Rivkind, supra note 8, at 1334–35; Shatz, supra note 18, at 737–45. 
100 Shatz, supra note 18, at 738–45. 
101 KREITZBERG, supra note 30, at 10. 
102 Id. at 48. 
103 Michael L. Radelet & Glenn L. Pierce, Race and Prosecutorial Discretion in 
Homicide Cases, 19 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 587, 607–15 (1985) [hereinafter Race and 
Prosecutorial Discretion]. 
104 Abernathy v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d 726, 730 n.5 (Ct. App. 2007) 
(“Subdivision (a)(2) of section 190.9 specifies certain procedures when the prosecutor gives 
notice of intention to seek the death penalty; however, it does not require such notice.”). 
105 CAL. R. CT. 8.613(b). 
106 ROMAN ET AL., RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 67, at 570–71. 
107 Celesta A. Albonetti, Criminality, Prosecutorial Screening, and Uncertainty: Toward 
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a tactical tool, broadly filing death-eligible charges at the beginning stages 
of the process and subsequently deciding which cases will be prosecuted 
capitally based on the odds of securing a guilty verdict (and more 
specifically, a death sentence).  This sort of strategic maneuver is 
advantageous to prosecutors for several reasons.  Foremost, by filing at 
least one special circumstance allegation in a wide range of cases, 
prosecutors are afforded a considerable amount of flexibility when 
responding to community sentiment.  For instance, prosecutors can file 
special circumstance allegations during the initial charging stage, and then 
gauge whether or not public outrage surrounding a particular case warrants 
the filing of a death notice. 
The filing of special circumstance allegations in a wide range of cases 
may also augment prosecutors’ bargaining power in plea negotiations.108  
The informal structure of plea bargaining allows prosecutors and defense 
attorneys to formulate several iterations of plea agreements before a 
consensus is reached between both parties.109  The recursive nature of this 
process allows defense attorneys to negotiate the best possible pleas for 
their clients.  In death-eligible cases, however, the negotiation process is 
severely undercut by the unequal power differential between the defense 
and prosecution.  Defense attorneys’ decisions are often dictated by 
prosecutors’ ability to leverage aggravating circumstances and a death 
notice.  When a special circumstance allegation is filed, defense attorneys 
are left with two options—advise their clients to plead guilty or run the risk 
of advancing to a capital trial by rejecting the plea bargain.  The lack of plea 
options available in death-eligible cases may force a defendant to accept a 
guilty plea that will result in an LWOP sentence in order to avoid the risk of 
receiving a death sentence at trial. 
Two recent empirical studies demonstrate the potentially coercive 
nature of plea negotiations in death-eligible cases.  Kuziemko used the 
 
a Theory of Discretionary Decision Making in Felony Case Processings, 24 CRIMINOLOGY 
623, 626 (1986) [hereinafter Criminality, Prosecutorial Screening, and Uncertainty]; Celesta 
A. Albonetti, Prosecutorial Discretion: The Effects of Uncertainty, 21 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
291, 295 (1987) [hereinafter Prosecutorial Discretion]; William M. Landes, An Economic 
Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & ECON. 61, 62 n.2 (1971); Eric Rasmusen et al., Convictions 
Versus Conviction Rates: The Prosecutor’s Choice, 11 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 47, 53–61 
(2009). 
108 See CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE 
AND MISTAKE 53 (2d ed. 1981); Robert M. Bohm, The Economic Costs of Capital 
Punishment: Past, Present, and Future, in AMERICA’S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT: REFLECTIONS ON THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF THE ULTIMATE PENAL 
SANCTION 573, 578 n.6 (James R. Acker et al. eds., 2d ed. 2003) [hereinafter AMERICA’S 
EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT]. 
109 Debra S. Emmelman, Trial by Plea Bargain: Case Settlement as a Product of 
Recursive Decisionmaking, 30 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 335, 356–57 (1996). 
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reinstatement of New York State’s capital punishment system in 1995 as a 
naturalistic experiment of capital plea-bargaining practices.110  Data on 
first-degree and second-degree murder cases filed in New York State from 
1995 to 2000 was used to examine the effect of capital punishment on a 
defendant’s propensity to plead guilty.  Results indicate that defendants 
prosecuted in counties that actively sought the death penalty were more 
likely to plead guilty to their original arraignment charges than defendants 
prosecuted in non-death penalty counties; that is, defendants charged in 
active death penalty counties in New York are more likely to accept harsher 
plea agreements.111  However, the threat of capital punishment does not 
appear to increase a defendant’s overall propensity to plead guilty.112 
Ehrhard’s qualitative analysis of plea-bargaining practices in an 
unidentified state sheds light on the interactional dynamics involved in 
capital plea agreements.113  Results from a series of open-ended interviews 
with prosecutors and defense attorneys indicate that the death penalty is 
frequently used to induce guilty pleas.114  As one defense attorney candidly 
notes: 
[P]rosecutors “say they don’t” but “do, absolutely” use the threat of death as leverage 
to induce a plea, this is “one of the most duplicitous parts of the process in my book, 
when you go in for a plea on a case that is capital eligible or on which a notice has 
been filed and they require the client to say that I’m pleading knowingly, freely, and 
voluntarily and ‘no, I haven’t been coerced.’  Bull-shit you haven’t been coerced.”115 
Another defense attorney claimed that plea bargaining in death-eligible 
cases rarely involves a sentence of life with the possibility of parole: “I 
don’t know anybody who pleads to life with parole.  It’s always LWOP 
versus the death penalty.”116  The majority of defense attorneys noted that 
the choice between an LWOP sentence and the possibility of advancing to a 
capital trial led them to advise their clients to plead guilty in order to avoid 
the death penalty.  Many defense attorneys were fully aware of the power 
differential created by the threat of capital charges, characterizing plea 
agreements in death-eligible cases as “take it or leave it” endeavors rather 
than actual “negotiations.”117  Prosecutors also acknowledged that the threat 
 
110 Ilyana Kuziemko, Does the Threat of the Death Penalty Affect Plea Bargaining in 
Murder Cases? Evidence from New York’s 1995 Reinstatement of Capital Punishment, 8 
AM. L. & ECON. REV. 116, 116–19 (2006). 
111 Id. at 125–30. 
112 Id. 
113 See generally Ehrhard, supra note 29, at 313–25 (providing an empirical analysis of 
this issue). 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 316. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 318. 
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of capital punishment is frequently used to induce a guilty plea, even 
though nearly all denied ever engaging in such activities.118  Ultimately, the 
unequal power structure created by the capital plea-bargaining process may 
undermine defendants’ rights regardless of whether or not prosecutors 
intentionally coerce defendants with the threat of capital charges. 
While prosecutors engage in a cost–benefit analysis when deciding 
how to charge and pursue cases,119 the risk of losing in a capital case is 
mitigated by the fact that death-qualified juries are more conviction-prone 
than regular criminal juries.  Thus, the chances of getting a conviction, 
particularly in cases in which multiple special circumstances can be filed, 
are enhanced.120  In addition, prosecutors often focus on maximizing their 
chances of conviction while minimizing the risks of a trial, and thus they do 
not necessarily consider the financial impact their charging decisions will 
have on the courts over the long run, even if the case ultimately ends in a 
plea agreement.121 
 
118 Id. at 319–23. 
119 See generally Albonetti, Criminality, Prosecutorial Screening, and Uncertainty, 
supra note 107; Albonetti, Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 107; Landes, supra note 
107; Rasmusen et al., supra note 107 (examining the cost–benefit analysis conducted by 
prosecutors). 
120 This effect has been empirically demonstrated by at least three factors.  First, death 
qualification excludes minorities and women at disproportionate rates and these 
demographic factors are correlated with conviction-proneness, in that white men are more 
conviction-prone than others.  Second, the death-qualification process itself biases those 
subject to it in favor of conviction.  Third, support for the death penalty is highly correlated 
with other attitudes about justice, due process, and crime control, such that death-qualified 
jurors have lower evidentiary thresholds for proof of guilt, and higher tolerance for false 
convictions than non-qualified jurors.  For a review, see Mona Lynch, The Social 
Psychology of Capital Cases, in 1 JURY PSYCHOLOGY: SOCIAL ASPECTS OF TRIAL PROCESSES, 
at 157, 163–65 (Joel D. Lieberman & Daniel A. Krauss eds., 2009).  See generally Joseph 
W. Filkins et al., An Evaluation of the Biasing Effects of Death Qualification: A Meta-
Analytic/Computer Simulation Approach, in THEORY AND RESEARCH ON SMALL GROUPS 153, 
161–65 (R. Scott Tindale et al. eds., 1998) (reporting on a small effect size for conviction-
proneness overall, and a larger effect size for the exclusion of minorities as a result of death 
qualification); Craig Haney et al., “Modern” Death Qualification: New Data on Its Biasing 
Effects, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 619, 624–30 (1994) (reporting findings on the demographic 
impacts of death qualification, based on a California sample); William C. Thompson et al., 
Death Penalty Attitudes and Conviction Proneness: The Translation of Attitudes into 
Verdicts, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 95, 106–09 (1984) (reporting on the constellation of 
attitudes that make death-qualified juries more conviction prone).  Relatedly, see Marla 
Sandys, Stacking the Deck for Guilt and Death: The Failure of Death Qualification to 
Ensure Impartiality, in AMERICA’S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 108, 
at 385, 402–06 (discussing the overinclusion of excludable “automatic death penalty” jurors, 
who are especially likely to be conviction-prone). 
121 In some instances, prosecutors consider capital punishment costs when making 
charging decisions (e.g., Baicker, supra note 32, at 3, 13, and Rupp, supra note 32, at 2758–
61), yet in others, they ignore such financial concerns (e.g., Russell Gold, Counties Struggle 
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II. METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK 
This study attempts to assess the potential time-costs and 
consequences associated with Los Angeles County’s death penalty system 
by drawing insights from a data set of 7,258 defendants charged with 
murder (PC § 187) or voluntary manslaughter (PC § 192(a)) between 1996 
and 2008.  This data set was obtained directly from the Los Angeles County 
DA’s Office via a public records request.  There are two advantages to 
focusing on Los Angeles County homicide cases.  First, the Los Angeles 
County DA’s Office is the largest prosecutorial agency in the United 
States,122 making it an ideal locale for studying the time-costs of capital 
punishment.  Second, Los Angeles County sentences more defendants to 
death than any other county in California.123  Approximately 30% of all 
capital cases in California originate in Los Angeles County.124 
Because prior research indicates that homicide cases that result in 
second-degree murder or voluntary manslaughter charges at adjudication 
are often factually death eligible, we included all homicide cases involving 
charges of first-degree murder, second-degree murder, and voluntary 
manslaughter.125  Homicide cases that were filed by the DA’s office but 
were later dismissed are excluded from the data set as they do not belong to 
the sample of interest (i.e., cases actually processed through the court 
system).  In contrast, defendants who were initially charged with murder or 
voluntary manslaughter but subsequently had these charges downgraded to 
a lower offense such as involuntary manslaughter are included in the 
sample.  Defendants represent the basic unit of analysis.  Defendants tried 
within a multiple-defendant case are treated as statistically dependent 
observations.126  Clustered standard errors were calculated using Stata’s 
“vce (cluster id)” command to account for “clustering among prosecutors, 
defense attorneys and judges, all of which might reasonably be related to 
the cost of a case.”127 
 
With High Cost of Prosecuting Death-Penalty Cases, WALL ST. J., Jan. 9, 2002, at B1). 
122 See L.A. CNTY. DIST. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, http://da.lacounty.gov/default.htm (last 
visited Sep. 23, 2012). 
123 See CONDEMNED INMATE LIST, supra note 22 (this figure was calculated by dividing 
the number of death-row inmates sentenced in Los Angeles County by the total number of 
California death-row inmates). 
124 See id. 
125 Baldus et al., supra note 17, at 160. 
126 Id. at 157. 
127 Roman et al., Reassessing the Cost of the Death Penalty, supra note 66, at 568; see 
also LAWRENCE C. HAMILTON, STATISTICS WITH STATA: UPDATED FOR VERSION 10, at 254 
(2009); STATACORP, STATA USER’S GUIDE RELEASE 11, at 300–02  (11th ed. 2009) 
[hereinafter STATACORP]. 
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A. LOGISTIC REGRESSION PREDICTING THE FILING OF A DEATH 
NOTICE AMONG DEATH-ELIGIBLE CASES 
In this section we develop a logistic regression model to examine 
death-notice filings among death-eligible cases.  California’s extensive list 
of statutorily defined aggravating circumstances provides prosecutors with 
considerable leeway in determining which cases will become death 
eligible.128  A similar degree of prosecutorial discretion surrounds the 
selection of capital cases from the wide range of death-eligible cases.  In the 
absence of statewide standards for the filing of death notices, each DA has 
developed her own protocol for selecting capital cases.129  This has led to 
considerable variation in the process of filing special circumstance 
allegations and death notices.130 
In this context, an important policy question arises: What legally 
relevant factors do prosecutors use to select capital cases and how does this 
selection method influence the processing of homicide cases within Los 
Angeles County’s court system?  The filing of a death notice has profound 
financial implications for prosecution of other criminal cases within the 
same county;131 therefore, the selection process is particularly relevant to 
the handling of all homicide cases.  Because prosecutors generally seek to 
maximize their conviction rates and in capital cases they strive to obtain 
death sentences, it is hypothesized that the special circumstance committee 
will be more likely to file a death notice in cases containing multiple special 
circumstance allegations.  On the other hand, the odds of a death-notice 
filing may be higher for multiple special circumstance cases because the 
special circumstance committee perceives them to be more serious.  
Measures of case seriousness and criminal history were added to the model 
in order to test this alternative hypothesis. 
B. COX PROPORTIONAL HAZARD REGRESSION PREDICTING 
TIME-TO-RESOLUTION 
The dependent variable analyzed in Models 2–4 is time-to-resolution 
(measured as the number of calendar days from a case’s filing date to its 
resolution date).132  For pending cases, time-to-resolution is measured as the 
 
128 See CCFAJ, supra note 1, at 17; Shatz & Rivkind, supra note 8, at 1331. 
129 Letter from Natasha Minsker, supra note 15, at 4–6. 
130 CALDWELL ET AL., supra note 30, at 5–6; Letter from Natasha Minsker, supra note 15, 
at 4–6. 
131 Garey, supra note 62, at 1254–55; see also Gradess & Davies, supra note 55, at 407–
09; Charles S. Lanier et al., Introduction and Overview—The Future of America’s Death 
Penalty: An Agenda for the Next Generation of Capital Punishment Research, in THE 
FUTURE OF AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY, supra note 9, at 3, 7. 
132 A total of 297 cases were resolved through consolidation.  In addition, eighty-one 
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number of calendar days from the filing date to the last date in the data set 
(November 7, 2008).133  The use of time-to-resolution as a proxy measure 
for cost is justified on several grounds.  Foremost, county-level financial 
data on capital cases is often unreliable.134  In addition, a large proportion of 
the cost differential between capital and noncapital homicide cases stems 
from the fact that capital cases simply take longer to reach resolution.135  
According to Roman et al.: “The majority (70%) of the cost differential 
between a death-notice and a non-death-notice case occurs during the trial 
phase.  This difference is due to a greater number of pre-trial motions, 
longer and more intensive voir dire, longer trials and a greater amount of 
general preparation time.”136  Using time-to-resolution as a proxy measure 
for cost also provides methodological advantages.  Estimates based on a 
small sample of “average” capital cases likely suffer from measurement 
error due to the fact that criminal justice officials find it difficult to 
accurately assess which cases are “typical.”137  Therefore, models using a 
time-to-resolution dependent variable likely produce more reliable 
estimates of the potential cost differential between death-eligible and non-
death-eligible cases than those based on a small sample of “average” cases. 
Two hypotheses regarding the time-to-resolution measure were 
derived from the extant literature.  As previously noted, the implementation 
 
cases contained sentencing information, but were listed as “filed” or “charges consolidated” 
in the DA’s data set.  However, because these cases had sentencing information, they were 
coded as resolved.  The substantive conclusions of Models 2–4 do not change when these 
378 cases are coded as right-censored (i.e., pending) or excluded. 
133 Cases filed on the last date of data collection (November 7, 2008) were coded as 
right-censored and given a time-to-resolution value of 1, since each defendant “survived” at 
least one day. 
134 CCFAJ, supra note 1, at 39, 96–98; EVERINGHAM, supra note 1, at 3–4; Letter from 
Natasha Minsker, supra note 15, at 4–6. 
135 COOK ET AL., THE COSTS OF PROCESSING MURDER CASES IN NORTH CAROLINA, supra 
note 70, at 2; TERANCE D. MIETHE, ESTIMATES OF TIME SPENT IN CAPITAL AND NON-CAPITAL 
MURDER CASES: A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF SURVEY DATA FROM CLARK COUNTY DEFENSE 
ATTORNEYS 2–5 (2012), available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/ClarkNV 
CostReport.pdf. 
136 ROMAN ET AL., RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 67, at 30.  The time-to-resolution 
measure represents a critical component of most cost studies.  See id. at 18.  For example, 
Roman and colleagues calculated costs using the following formula: “Cost = Price of unit of 
input X Quantity of inputs.”  Id.  According to this formula, price and quantity are calculated 
separately such that cost is defined as the “price of an hour of an attorney’s time . . . 
multipl[ied] . . . by the number of hours spent by that attorney in each stage of case 
processing.”  Id.  Likewise, Miethe calculates the capital costs as the product of attorney 
wages and attorney hours spent preparing a particular case.  MIETHE, supra note 135, at 8–9.  
Our data does not contain a breakdown of the time spent during each phase of the case 
processing, and it is thus not possible to calculate the costs associated with various stages of 
the pretrial and trial processes. 
137 EVERINGHAM, supra note 1, at 5. 
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of procedural safeguards in capital cases (e.g., appointment of special 
counsel, death qualification, additional motions, etc.) dramatically increases 
the amount of time devoted to pretrial investigations and litigation 
efforts.138  As such, it is hypothesized that capital cases will take 
significantly longer to reach resolution than noncapital cases.  Roman et 
al.’s survey results suggest that special circumstance cases take longer to 
reach resolution than non-special circumstance cases.139  In addition, 
California Rule of the Court 8.613(b) requires that defense attorneys 
prepare special circumstance cases for the possibility of capital 
prosecution.140  Accordingly, we predict that special circumstance cases 
will take significantly longer to reach resolution than non-special 
circumstance cases. 
Cox Proportional Hazard (PH) regression was used to estimate the 
effect of covariates on time-to-resolution.  The main advantage of Cox PH 
regression over parametric survival analysis techniques (exponential, 
Weibull, gamma, etc.) is that it does not require specification of the baseline 
hazard rate, thereby minimizing the possibility of misspecification with 
regard to the baseline rate.141  In comparison to Ordinary Least Squares 
regression, Cox PH regression more effectively addresses non-normality in 
the outcome variable as well as censoring.142  Cox PH regression produces 
coefficient estimates in the form of a hazard ratio; values larger than 1 
imply an increase in the hazard (and thus a decrease in survival time), while 
hazard ratios less than 1 indicate a decrease in the hazard rate (and thus an 
increase in survival time).143  Hazard ratios can also be interpreted as a 
percentage change in the hazard rate using the following formula: [exp β(xi 
= X1) – exp β(xi = X2) / exp β(xi = X2)]*100.144 
C. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
In order to faciliate policy-relevant comparisons between various types 
of homicide cases, we use several measures of death penalty status and 
death eligibility.  The main predictors of interest for Models 2–4 were 
dichotomously coded as follows: (a) capital case (1 = death notice filed and 
0 = no death notice filed); (b) special circumstance case (1 = at least one 
 
138 CCFAJ, supra note 1, at 22–23; ROMAN ET AL., RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 67, at 
9–15; Alarcón & Mitchell, supra note 21, at S75–S78; Erickson, supra note 90, at 11. 
139 Roman et al., Reassessing the Cost of the Death Penalty, supra note 66, at 569–71. 
140 See supra text accompanying note 105. 
141 JANET M. BOX-STEFFENSMEIER & BRADFORD S. JONES, EVENT HISTORY MODELING: A 
GUIDE FOR SOCIAL SCIENTISTS 47 (2004). 
142 Id. at 16–18. 
143 Id. at 50, 59–61. 
144 See id. at 60. 
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special circumstance but no death notice filed and 0 = no special 
circumstance filed); (c) single special circumstance case (1 = one special 
circumstance but no death notice filed and 0 = no special circumstance 
filed); and (d) multiple special circumstance case (1 = two or more special 
circumstances but no death notice filed and 0 = no special circumstance 
filed).  For Model 1, the multiple special circumstance variable was coded 
in a slightly different manner (1 = two or more special circumstances filed 
and 0 = single special circumstance filed). 
Models 1–4 utilize many of the same independent variables because 
measures of case complexity and offense severity are likely related to both 
the filing of a death notice and time-to-resolution.  In general, cases 
involving serious offenses (e.g., multiple counts, sentencing enhancements, 
etc.) are more complex to the extent that they require additional procedural 
safeguards and greater logistical coordination between criminal justice 
agencies (e.g., courts, prosecutors, etc.).  Greater case complexity, in turn, 
requires that attorneys dedicate additional time to pretrial investigative 
work and the filing of motions at trial.  Measures of complexity and offense 
severity are included to help rule out alternative explanations for observed 
differences in the probability of a death-notice filing and time-to-resolution 
hazard rate.  The number of criminal counts was logarithmically 
transformed to model its diminishing effect.  Cases involving multiple 
criminal counts likely contain more witnesses and evidentiary exhibits at 
trial, thereby requiring additional pretrial preparation and motions at trial.  
Likewise, it would seem that cases involving numerous counts are more 
likely to elicit public outrage, and thus have a higher probability of 
receiving a death notice. 
The following sentencing enhancements were added to Models 1–4 to 
control for case seriousness/complexity: prior prison term sentencing 
enhancement (PC § 667.5(a)); habitual offender sentencing enhancement 
(PC § 667(a)(1)); and gang sentencing enhancement (PC § 186.22(b)).  
Cases with multiple defendants may take longer to reach resolution because 
they require greater logistical coordination between various criminal justice 
actors and agencies.  In contrast, multiple defendant variables were 
excluded from Model 1 because there is no apparent reason why the 
presence of multiple defendants would be related to the probability of 
receiving a death notice.  Lastly, defendant gender (1 = male and 0 = 
female) was included in Model 1.145  Defendant gender was excluded from 
Models 2–4 because it would logically seem to have little impact on the 
 
145 The data set included no other demographic data, so we were unable to control for 
factors that may well be important to prosecutorial decisionmaking, including defendant and 
victim race.  See generally Pierce & Radelet, The Impact of Legally Inappropriate Factors, 
supra note 31, at 19–25 (analyzing race as a factor in prosecutorial decisionmaking). 
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length of a case. 
Organizational, political, and caseload factors are relevant to both the 
filing of a death notice and time-to-resolution.  To control for unobserved 
annual differences in organizational factors, a series of dummy variables 
were included for each file-year from 1997 to 2008 (the reference file-year 
category is 1996).  Cases filed in years with a heavy caseload may take 
longer to reach resolution due to backlogs in the courts.  Similarly, cases 
prosecuted in file-years with a high homicide rate might be either less likely 
to involve a death notice due to resource drain or more likely to involve a 
death notice due to political pressure stemming from a high homicide rate. 
D. MISSING DATA 
A total of 531 cases (7% of the sample) are missing allegation 
information and eleven defendants had no recorded gender.  Among these 
defendants with missing allegation information, twenty-four were 
prosecuted capitally.  In addition, twelve capital defendants had allegation 
information but were not charged with at least one special circumstance 
allegation.  The DA’s office was contacted several times regarding this 
matter, but officials did not comment on the error.  The original data set 
was left intact because the DA’s office was unwilling to provide additional 
assistance in locating the source of this error.  In other words, despite the 
absence of allegation information, these thirty-six defendants were coded as 
capital defendants charged with one special circumstance.  This is a 
reasonable approach given that capital cases are defined by the presence of 
at least one special circumstance allegation and the filing of a death 
notice.146  In contrast, the number of special circumstance allegations for 
each of these thirty-six defendants was coded as missing because there is no 
reliable method for determining whether or not multiple special 
circumstance allegations were filed. 
Multiple imputations were used to fill in missing allegation and gender 
information.  The following binary variables were imputed ten times using 
Stata’s “mi impute mvn” command: single special circumstance case, 
multiple special circumstance case, prior prison term sentencing 
enhancement, habitual offender sentencing enhancement, gang sentencing 
enhancement, and defendant gender.  Predictor variables in the imputation 
equation included the following: time-to-resolution, death penalty case, two 
defendants, three or more defendants, file-years 1997 through 2008, and 
pending case.  A second equation using the same predictors was used to 
multiply impute the special circumstance variable ten times because it was 
collinear with measures regarding the number of special circumstances 
 
146 CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 190.2, 190.4 (West 2008). 
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(single vs. multiple).  Following the advice of StataCorp,147 we rounded 
down imputed values smaller than 0.50 to 0, while imputed values larger 
than 0.50 were rounded up to 1.  Accordingly, the final imputed variables 
analyzed in Models 1–4 were dichotomously coded.  The substantive results 
of Models 1–4 are virtually the same when defendants with missing 
information are excluded, suggesting that these observations do not bias 
coefficient estimates (results not shown).  Results from the multiply 
imputed versions of Models 1–4 are presented below because they yield 
more robust estimates due to the increase in statistical power stemming 
from a larger sample size. 
E. RESULTS 
Summary statistics displayed in Table 1 indicate that death-eligible 
cases tend to exhibit greater complexity along a number of dimensions.  
The mean/median time-to-resolution is considerably longer for death-
eligible defendants compared to non-death-eligible defendants.  Death-
eligible cases also have a larger number of defendants and criminal charges.  
Sentencing enhancements for a prior prison term and habitual criminal 
history are more likely to be filed in death-eligible cases.  Non-special 
circumstance cases have the largest percentage of sentencing enhancements 
for gang activity.  A large proportion of death-eligible cases contain a 
felony-murder special circumstance (PC § 190.2(a)(17)) as either one of 
many aggravating circumstances or as the sole aggravating circumstance.  
However, capital cases are less likely to contain a felony-murder special 
circumstance as the only aggravating circumstance.  Given prior research 
on prosecutorial discretion regarding the “upgrading” and “downgrading” 
of felony-murder charges,148 these patterns suggest that deputy DAs use 
felony-murder allegations to increase the pool of death-eligible cases so that 
at a later point, they can more selectively decide which cases will be 
prosecuted capitally.  Lastly, capital cases are more likely than special 
circumstance cases to involve multiple special circumstance allegations. 
 
147 See generally STATACORP LP, STATA MULTIPLE-IMPUTATION REFERENCE MANUAL 
108–10 (11th ed. 2009) (describing this process). 
148 See Radelet & Pierce, Race and Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 103, at 587, 
607–15. 
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics by Case Type (N = 7258) 






























— — 0.26 0.44 0.57 0.5 
Log (Number 
of Counts) 
1.22 0.49 1.46 0.55 1.84 0.73 
Two 
Defendants 
0.23 0.42 0.3 0.46 0.34 0.47 
Three or More 
Defendants 
0.13 0.34 0.26 0.44 0.27 0.45 
Gang 
Enhancementa 




0.12 0.32 0.12 0.32 0.28 0.45 
Prior Prison 
Enhancementa 
0.14 0.35 0.12 0.32 0.22 0.42 
Male 
Defendanta  
0.93 0.25 0.93 0.26 0.96 0.21 
Felony-Murder 
Chargea 
— — 0.55 0.5 0.53 0.5 
Felony-Murder 
Charge as Only 
Special 
Circumstancea 
— — 0.41 0.49 0.21 0.40 
Pending Case 0.13 0.33 0.14 0.35 0.18 0.38 
a. Some observations are missing. For details on the missing data strategy, see Part 
II.D.  
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These figures have implications for detention costs associated with 
homicide cases.  Information obtained on a sample of three capital 
defendants housed in the Los Angeles County jail during 2010 was used to 
calculate detention costs.  Financial records obtained from the California 
Department of Finance through a public records request indicate that it cost 
$77.17 per day to detain a capital inmate in the Los Angeles County jail 
during 2010.  Based on the median time-to-resolution displayed in Table 1, 
the typical detention costs for each case type are as follows: (1) non-special 
circumstance cases = $30,646 ($77 x 398 days); special circumstance = 
$42,350 ($77 x 550 days); capital case = $68,376 ($77 x 888 days).149  
These estimates represent just one crude indicator of the cost differential 
between capital and noncapital cases.  In fact, these estimates are likely 
conservative because they do not include additional travel costs borne each 
day the defendant is transported between the county jail and courthouse as 
part of the trial process.  In addition to detention costs, there are a myriad of 
factors that make capital cases more expensive than noncapital cases, 
including the appointment of additional attorneys and investigators, the 
death-qualification process, and extra court appearances.150  Capital cases 
each require the appointment of two defense attorneys and investigators 
hired to gather information on a defendant’s life history as mitigating 
evidence.  The jury-selection process involved in capital cases is more 
complicated than that in noncapital cases, requiring that each juror be death 
qualified.  Attempts to calculate these additional costs were stymied by the 
DA’s refusal to provide us with financial records for capital cases. 
 
149 The median, rather than the mean, is used to calculate detention costs because it is 
more resistant to extreme observations and pending cases.  See MIETHE, supra note 135, at 1. 
150 Alarcón & Mitchell, supra note 21, at S75–S79; see also, e.g., CARTER ET AL., supra 
note 17, at 16; ROMAN ET AL., RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 67, at 30; Haney, The Social 
Context of Capital Murder, supra note 87, at 548 (observing that the capital punishment 
process is “costly”); Letter from Natasha Minsker, supra note 15, at 6, 8–9 (considering 
distinguishing factors of capital cases that may increase costs, including delay in deciding 
whether to pursue the death penalty and relative uninvolvement of defense counsel); cf. 
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 608 (1978) (holding that capital defendants have the 
constitutional right to present evidence of relevant mitigating factors). 
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Table 2 indicates that the DA’s office files special circumstance 
allegations in a wide range of homicide cases.  On average, special 
circumstance allegations were filed in approximately 29% of all homicide 
cases between 1996 and 2006.  This suggests that the DA’s office broadly 
files special circumstance allegations during the beginning stages of the 
charging process, deciding later which cases will be prosecuted capitally.  
Among defendants charged with one or more special circumstance 
allegations, about 15% were prosecuted capitally.  Roughly 42% of capital 
cases resulted in a death sentence during the period of analysis, and thus 
valuable resources were spent preparing the other 58% of death penalty 
Table 2 
Funneling of Homicide Defendants by File-Yeara 
File-
Year 


















1996 722 219 30% 45 21% 24 53% 
1997 609 187 31% 47 25% 15 32% 
1998 592 210 35% 33 16% 12 36% 
1999 499 157 31% 28 18% 10 36% 
2000 474 155 33% 17 11% 8 47% 
2001 539 127 24% 15 12% 6 40% 
2002 587 166 28% 11 07% 7 64% 
2003 518 158 31% 8 05% 6 75% 
2004 584 189 32% 43 23% 16 37% 
2005 581 157 27% 21 13% 2 10% 
2006 571 123 22% 14 11% 5 36% 
Avg.b 570.55 168 29% 25.64 15% 10.09 42% 
2007 597 133 22% 6 0.5% 0 0% 
2008 385 76 20% 3 0.4% 0 0% 
a.  Some observations are missing.  For details on the missing data strategy, 
see Part II.D. 
b. File years 2007–2008 are excluded from mean calculations due to the 
large number of pending cases. 
Notes: Percentages are rounded to the second decimal place. Defs. = 
Defendants; DE Defs. = Death-eligible defendants (capital and special 
circumstance cases); Capital Defs. = Capital defendants; Condemned 
Defs. = Defendants sentenced to death. 
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cases for capital litigation that did not result in a death sentence.  Applying 
Erickson’s151 cost estimates to the figures in Table 2, without adjusting for 
inflation, suggests that between 1996 and 2006, Los Angeles County spent 
upwards of $338 million prosecuting capital cases ($1.2 million per death 
penalty case multiplied by 282 death penalty cases).  Of this $338 million, 
roughly $205.2 million was spent prosecuting capital cases that did not 
result in death sentences ($1.2 million per capital case multiplied by 171 
capital cases that did not result in a death sentence).  These estimates should 
be interpreted cautiously given Erickson’s “average” case method;152 in 
other words, figures are indicative of the general resource drain imposed by 
capital cases rather than a precise estimate of such costs.  Although these 
crude cost estimates are subject to a high degree of measurement error, they 
vividly demonstrate the financial burden that capital cases place on Los 
Angeles County’s budget. 
Taken together, these summary statistics illustrate two ways in which 
Los Angeles County’s charging scheme drains resources from the criminal 
justice system: (1) preparing special circumstance cases for capital litigation 
even though a death notice is not ultimately sought in the vast majority of 
cases (85%); and (2) prosecuting capital cases in which a majority (58%) do 
not result in a death sentence. 
Model 1 supports the hypothesis that the special circumstance 
committee seeks to maximize its conviction rate by seeking the death 
penalty in multiple special circumstance cases.  Compared to cases 
involving a single special circumstance allegation, the odds of a death-
notice filing are 4.73 times higher for multiple special circumstance cases.  
A defendant’s criminal history and the seriousness of the crime being 
prosecuted also play a role in the decision to file a death notice.  The odds 
of a death-notice filing are 2.25 times higher for defendants charged with a 
habitual-offender sentencing enhancement153 compared to defendants who 
were not charged with a habitual-offender enhancement.   
 
151 See Erickson, supra note 90, at 3. 
152 Id. at 19–26. 
153 CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(a)(1) (West 2008). 




Logistic Regression Predicting a Death-Notice Filing 
Among Death-Eligible Cases (N = 2057) 
 Model 1 




Male Defendant 1.398 0.35 
Log (Number of Counts) 2.166** 0.172 




Gang Enhancement  1.072 0.239 
File-Year 1997b 1.104 0.316 
File-Year 1998  0.574 0.346 
File-Year 1999  0.785 0.415 
File-Year 2000  0.291* 0.548 
File-Year 2001  0.317* 0.551 
File-Year 2002 0.172** 0.542 
File-Year 2003 0.12** 0.578 
File-Year 2004  0.749 0.34 
File-Year 2005 0.455 0.48 
File-Year 2006  0.3* 0.515 
File-Year 2007  0.095** 0.583 
File-Year 2008  0.113** 0.824 
Intercept  0.03** 0.469 
Adjusted Pseudo R2  = 0.153   
*p < .05, **p < .01   
a. Reference = Single special circumstance case.  
b. Reference =1996 for all file-year variables. 
Notes: SE = standard error.  Sample includes death-eligible cases only (i.e., 
those containing at least one special circumstance allegation).  Estimates are 
rounded to the third decimal place.  Adjusted Pseudo R2 was derived using the 
“mibeta” command in Stata.  For all dichotomous variables, 1 represents the 
presence of the relevant category (e.g., 1 = gang enhancement and 0 = no gang 
enhancement). 
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 A one-unit increase in the log number of criminal counts charged against a 
defendant corresponds to a 2.16 increase in the odds ratio of a death-notice 
filing.  Several file-year variables are significant at α = 0.05: 2000–2003 
and 2006–2008.  This may indicate that the special circumstance committee 
takes agency-level caseload factors into account when deciding whether or 
not to seek the death penalty.  Conversely, this pattern could be attributable 
to political (e.g., DA election cycles) or personnel (e.g., changes in the 
number of deputy DAs, changes in personnel demographics, etc.) factors.  
Special circumstance cases filed after 1999 are less likely to result in a 
death notice than special circumstance cases filed in 1996.  This pattern 




Cox Proportional Hazard Regression Predicting  
Time-to-Resolution (N = 7258) 




























— — — — 0.577** 0.068 
Prior Prison 
Enhancement  




0.92 0.044 1.009 0.045 0.927 0.044 
Gang 
Enhancement  
1.001 0.036 1.039 0.036 0.963 0.036 
Log (Number 
of Counts) 
0.921** 0.026 1.026 0.027 0.98 0.027 
 
154 See supra Table 2. 
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Two 
Defendantsc 




0.742** 0.047 0.872** 0.047 0.802** 0.047 
File-Year 
1997d 
1.199* 0.075 1.388* 0.076 1.186 0.077 
File-Year 
1998  
0.991 0.072 1.168 0.073 1.013 0.072 
File-Year 
1999  
0.904 0.071 1.063 0.072 0.92 0.072 
File-Year 
2000  
0.823* 0.075 0.964 0.077 0.832* 0.077 
File-Year 
2001  
0.788** 0.072 0.894* 0.073 0.778** 0.073 
File-Year 
2002 
0.791** 0.069 0.911** 0.069 0.796** 0.069 
File-Year 
2003 
0.773** 0.074 0.908** 0.074 0.79** 0.074 
File-Year 
2004  
0.653** 0.067 0.743** 0.068 0.654** 0.068 
File-Year 
2005 
0.625** 0.07 0.716** 0.07 0.623** 0.07 
File-Year 
2006  
0.709** 0.072 0.8** 0.072 0.705** 0.072 
File-Year 
2007  
0.633** 0.094 0.753** 0.093 0.637** 0.093 
File-Year 
2008  
0.804 0.182 1.135 0.182 0.805 0.182 
*p < .05, **p < .01    
a. Reference for Model 2 = Noncapital cases (special circumstance and non-
special circumstance cases).  Reference for Models 3–4 = Non-special 
circumstance case. 
b. Reference = Non-special circumstance case. 
c. Reference = Single-defendant case. 
d. Reference = 1996 for all file-year variables. 
Notes: SE = standard error.  The Breslow method was used for ties.  
Estimates are rounded to the third decimal place.  For all dichotomous 
variables, 1 represents the presence of the relevant category (e.g., 1 = gang 
enhancement and 0 = no gang enhancement). 
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Before estimating Cox PH regression models, we nonparametrically 
analyzed differences in the survival functions for key variables using 
stratified Wilcoxon log-rank tests.  The following covariates were used for 
stratification purposes: habitual offender enhancement, prior prison 
enhancement, gang enhancement, number of counts, two defendants, three 
or more defendants, and file-years (1996–2008).  After controlling for these 
strata variables, results from the stratified Wilcoxon log-rank tests indicate 
that there are significant time-to-resolution differences between death-
eligible and non-death-eligible defendants: capital case vs. noncapital case 
(χ2 = 44.17, p < 0.01); capital case vs. non-special circumstance case (χ2 = 
83.69, p < 0.01); special circumstance case vs. non-special circumstance 
case (χ2 = 40.36, p < 0.01); single special circumstance and multiple special 
circumstance cases vs. non-special circumstance cases (χ2 = 44.56, p < 
0.01).155  Although log-rank tests are nonparametric, they provide useful 
summary information about the adjusted relationship between death 
eligibility and time-to-resolution that does not rely on the proportional 
hazards assumption.156 
Models 2–4 indicate that death-eligible cases take significantly longer 
to reach resolution than non-death-eligible cases.157  After controlling for 
 
155 Stratified Wilcoxon log-rank tests were conducted using non-imputed data because 
Stata does not allow the “sts test” command to be used with imputed data.  Stata omitted 
some observations from the log-rank tests because the strata for the file-year and number of 
counts variables had too few failures.  The substantive conclusions of the Wilcoxon log-rank 
tests are nearly the same when these variables are not used for stratification purposes. 
156 BOX-STEFFENSMEIER & JONES, supra note 141, at 131–37 (2004); DAVID MACHIN ET 
AL., SURVIVAL ANALYSIS: A PRACTICAL APPROACH 149 (2d ed. 2006). 
157 Schoenfeld residual analyses of Models 2–4 using non-imputed data indicate that the 
proportional hazards assumption is violated for several variables, including the following 
covariates of interest: capital case, special circumstance case, single special circumstance 
case, and multiple special circumstance case.  These diagnostic results are not surprising 
given that nonproportionality is commonplace in many social science fields.  See BOX-
STEFFENSMEIER & JONES, supra note 141, at 132, 136; see also Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier 
& Christopher J. Zorn, Duration Models and Proportional Hazards in Political Science, 45 
AM. J. POL. SCI. 972, 972 (2001); Judith D. Singer & John B. Willett, It’s About Time: Using 
Discrete-Time Survival Analysis to Study Duration and the Timing of Events, 18 J. EDUC. 
STAT. 155, 186 (1993); John B. Willett et al., The Design and Analysis of Longitudinal 
Studies of Development and Psychopathology in Context: Statistical Models and 
Methodological Recommendations, 10 DEV. & PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 395, 421 (1998).  Despite 
these indicators of nonproportionality, we present estimates from the Cox PH regression 
below because they are most pertinent to our main research question: Do death-eligible 
defendants take significantly longer to advance through the court system than non-death-
eligible defendants?  Cox PH regression estimates the average effect of covariates over time, 
thereby providing a parsimonious picture of the relationship between death eligibility and 
time-to-resolution.  BOX-STEFFENSMEIER & JONES, supra note 141, at 131–37; MACHIN ET 
AL., supra note 156, at 149; Box-Steffensmeier & Zorn, supra, at 974–75.  In this regard, as 
Machin and colleagues note, a standard Cox PH model may be preferable to a Cox PH 
1268 NICHOLAS PETERSEN & MONA LYNCH [Vol. 102 
case complexity and file-year effects, capital cases take 54% longer to reach 
resolution than comparable noncapital cases (special circumstance and non-
special circumstance) (see Model 2).  Cases involving one or more special 
circumstance allegations take 25% longer to reach resolution than those 
without a special circumstance (see Model 3).  In other words, even when a 
death-eligible case is not prosecuted capitally, the filing of one or more 
special circumstances significantly increases the time-to-resolution by 25%.  
The filing of multiple special circumstances also increases survival time.  
According to Model 4, cases with a single special circumstance take 25% 
longer to reach resolution than non-special circumstance cases, whereas 
cases involving two or more special circumstances take 42% longer to reach 
resolution than those without a special circumstance. 
In addition to death eligibility, several measures of case complexity 
and organizational capacity significantly predict time-to-resolution.  Cases 
involving three or more defendants (Models 2–4) and those with two 
defendants (Model 2) have a lower hazard ratio than single-defendant cases.  
Contrary to our hypotheses regarding case characteristics, only one measure 
of offense severity was statistically significant—log (number of counts) in 
Model 2.  Many of the hazard ratios for file-years 2000 to 2007 are 
significant and less than one.  This pattern could possibly be attributed to 
the large number of cases filed from 1996 to 1998 (see Table 2 above).  The 
large influx of cases filed from 1996 to 1998 may have created a backlog in 
the court system that dramatically slowed down the time-to-resolution of 
subsequent cases.  In light of the large standard error associated with file-
year 2008, the hazard ratio for this variable is likely nonsignificant due to 
the large number of pending cases filed in 2008. 
III. DISCUSSION 
These findings shed light on charging practices and their efficiency 
costs in Los Angeles County.  Summary statistics demonstrate that 
prosecutors broadly file special circumstance allegations, deciding later 
which cases will be prosecuted capitally.  Results from Model 1 support our 
hypothesis that the special circumstance committee seeks to maximize the 
 
model with time interactions that addresses issues of nonproportionality if temporal changes 
in the effect of covariates are not central to the analysis: 
If the PH [proportional hazard] assumption is not valid in the data, one may use ‘time-varying 
covariates’ in the Cox model to capture the non-PH . . . .  However, the violation of this 
[proportional hazard] assumption is not necessarily unacceptable.  To assume PH is essentially to 
estimate the effect of an independent variable averaged over time and ignore the possibility that 
the effect may vary over time.  A simple model based on the assumption of PH is sometimes 
preferable to a more ‘correct’ but complex model if the added complexity does not identify 
features of scientific or clinical significance. 
 MACHIN ET AL., supra note 156, at 149. 
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odds of receiving a conviction by selectively filing death notices in cases 
involving multiple special circumstance allegations.  This pattern remains 
robust even after controlling for other measures of criminal history and 
seriousness of the offense. 
Findings from Models 2–4 highlight the time-costs associated with the 
prosecution of capital cases.  As hypothesized, capital cases take 
significantly longer to reach resolution after controlling for measures of 
case complexity and crime seriousness, and as a result resources are drained 
from criminal justice agencies at the county level.  Results confirm prior 
bivariate research indicating that capital cases are more costly and time-
consuming at the pretrial and trial stages than similar noncapital cases.158  
Our findings also indicate that the time-cost differential between death-
eligible and non-death-eligible cases is a function of the intensity of 
resources required to process capital and special circumstance cases rather 
than an artifact of omitted variable bias resulting from the use of bivariate 
techniques.  In other words, these estimates illustrate that the effect of death 
eligibility on time-to-resolution is robust across a range of contexts and 
methodological approaches, thereby corroborating prior bivariate estimates. 
Models 2–4 also underscore the importance of assessing infrastructure 
costs associated with Los Angeles County’s death penalty system.  Special 
circumstance cases take significantly longer to reach resolution even when 
prosecutors decline to seek the death penalty.  Although it is not possible to 
translate the coefficients from Models 2–4 into precise dollar amounts, 
these results clearly highlight the time-costs associated with maintaining the 
death penalty at the county level even when no death sentences are actively 
being sought.  Taken together, results from Models 1–4 suggest that a large 
proportion of these costs are derived from single special circumstance cases 
that had a low probability of ever being selected by the special circumstance 
committee for capital prosecution.  The costs of preparing special 
circumstance cases for capital litigation are compounded by the fact that 
two attorneys and two investigators must be assigned to death-eligible 
cases.159  The indirect costs associated with special circumstance allegations 
are often overlooked by death penalty cost studies, but can dramatically 
affect the operating budgets of criminal justice agencies at the county 
level.160  It is clear that unrestrained charging decisions place a financial 
burden on the legal system given the large number of special circumstance 
 
158 See CCFAJ, supra note 1, at 34–43; Alarcón & Mitchell, supra note 21, at S41, S75;  
Garey, supra note 62, at 1269; Erickson, supra note 90, at 3. 
159 CCFAJ, supra note 1, at 42; MINSKER, THE HIDDEN DEATH TAX, supra note 34, at 7, 
32. 
160 See Gradess & Davies, supra note 55, at 409–11; Baicker, supra note 32, at 3; Rupp, 
supra note 32, at 2754. 
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cases filed each year. 
These results challenge the California District Attorneys Association’s 
(CDAA) claim that the use of capital plea bargaining lowers the costs of 
prosecuting homicide cases by reducing the amount of time spent handling 
cases at the trial and postconviction stages.  During the August 17, 2011, 
meeting of the California Assembly Appropriations Committee, 
representatives from the CDAA went on the record in opposition to state 
Senator Hancock’s death penalty abolition bill, arguing that if there were no 
death penalty, prosecutors would lose the “plea bargain effect” because no 
one would plead guilty to murder.161  According to the CDAA, the abolition 
of the death penalty would likely increase the costs of prosecuting homicide 
cases by encouraging defendants to go to trial when they otherwise would 
have pleaded guilty to LWOP or a lesser charge in an effort to avoid the 
possibility of obtaining a death sentence.162  The CDAA argues that this 
increase in the rate of homicide trials would, in turn, lead to the allocation 
of additional resources to homicide appeals.163  While this cost–benefit 
analysis assumes that the costs of prosecuting death penalty cases will be 
offset by increases in the number of potentially death-eligible cases that 
result in plea agreements, it does not account for the considerable amount of 
resources wasted preparing special circumstance cases for capital litigation 
that will not result in a death-notice filing.  Models 3 and 4 suggest that the 
overbroad charging practices may increase the costs of prosecution, with 
noncapital special circumstance cases taking significantly longer to reach 
resolution than non-special circumstance cases.  In fact, the number of 
special circumstance cases filed each year is considerably larger than the 
number of death penalty cases, and thus overbroad special circumstance 
filings may have a larger impact on county-level budgets than the CDAA 
acknowledges. 
We recognize that studies such as ours have a number of inherent 
limitations, largely due to the limited access to county-level prosecutors’ 
data granted to researchers, including ourselves.  Given the administrative 
nature of the data set, it contains few or no details pertaining to case-
processing characteristics (e.g., number of motions filed, hourly estimates, 
etc.) and defendant demographics (e.g., race, socioeconomic status, etc.).  In 
particular, the data set does not include a detailed breakdown of the total 
number of hours spent by various criminal justice officials on each case 
during the pretrial and trial processes or the costs associated with these 
activities.  As such, time-to-resolution was used as a proxy for cost, but we 
 
161 California Legislative Hearings, supra note 53. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. 
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are unable to translate that into an exact dollar amount.  Despite this 
drawback, the use of a time-to-resolution measure is the most reliable proxy 
measure of cost given the lack of publicly available financial data at the 
county level.164  Furthermore, the time-to-resolution model conservatively 
estimates death penalty time-costs since it does not account for increased 
salary expenses associated with death-eligible cases and the additional 
staffing required in such cases. 
The restricted geographical scope of this study may lower the external 
validity of model estimates.  However, concerns over external validity are 
counteracted by public policy implications.  Nearly 30% of defendants on 
California’s death row were sentenced in Los Angeles County, and 
therefore estimates derived from Los Angeles County account for a large 
portion of the variance in the time-costs associated with California’s death 
penalty system.165  Los Angeles County’s death penalty policies also have 
national significance.  In 2009, Los Angeles County distinguished itself by 
sentencing the most defendants in the nation to death, sending 13 people to 
death row.166  Consequently, Los Angeles County beat out other county-
level jurisdictions nationally.167  Indeed, only two states—Florida (15) and 
Arizona (14)—surpassed the county’s number of death sentences in 
2009.168  Ultimately, Los Angeles County accounted for 12% of the 
nation’s death sentences that year.169 
IV. PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Our results echo findings from a number of different kinds of analyses 
of capital punishment costs.  That is, these are resource-intensive endeavors 
 
164 CCFAJ, supra note 1, at 34–43, 77–84, 96–104; MINSKER, THE HIDDEN DEATH TAX, 
supra note 34, at 32. 
165 See CONDEMNED INMATE LIST, supra note 22 (this figure was calculated by dividing 
the number of death-row inmates sentenced in Los Angeles County by the total number of 
California death-row inmates). 
166 ACLU OF N. CAL., DEATH IN DECLINE ’09: A REPORT ON THE DEATH PENALTY i, 2–3 
(2010), available at https://www.aclunc.org/docs/criminal_justice/death_penalty/death_in_ 
decline_09.pdf (discussing the significance of Los Angeles County’s death penalty system in 
California and throughout the nation); Carol J. Williams & Jack Leonard, California Death 
Row Swells Despite Nationwide Decline in Death Sentences [Updated], L.A. TIMES (Dec. 
16, 2009, 11:16 AM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2009/12/california-death-row-
swells-as-execution-verdicts-drop-nationwide.html. 
167 Robert J. Smith, The Geography of the Death Penalty and its Ramifications, 92 B.U. 
L. REV. 227, 281 (2012). 
168 TRACY L. SNELL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT, 2009—STATISTICAL TABLES 8 (2010). 
169 Id.  In 2009, there were a total of 106 death sentences in the nation, 13 of which were 
imposed in Los Angeles County.  Accordingly, this figure was derived from the following 
calculation: 13/106 = 0.1226 (rounded to 12%). 
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that require major trade-offs at the local and state levels in order to fund 
them.170  On that front, excessive expenditures in this arena appear 
particularly problematic.171  However, costs are just one side of the question 
about whether capital punishment is justified as a criminal justice policy.  
Indeed, over the last few decades, many of the rationales espoused in 
defense of the death penalty have been seriously called into question.  Two 
of the most frequently cited penological justifications for the death 
penalty—deterrence and incapacitation—have largely been discredited by 
recent criminological research.172 
Many of the econometric studies from “new deterrence” literature, 
which claim to find a substantial capital punishment deterrent effect, suffer 
from a host of methodological and theoretical flaws.173  Once these 
methodological and theoretical deficits are corrected, the general deterrent 
effect of capital punishment disappears.174  These limitations have led 
criminologists to question conclusions drawn from the new deterrence 
literature.  For example, Radelet and Lacock’s175 survey of seventy-six 
eminent criminologists indicates that 88.2% of these individuals hold the 
expert opinion that the extant scientific literature does not provide support 
for a general deterrent effect of capital punishment.  Risk-assessment 
studies have also severely undercut the incapacitation justification for 
capital punishment by demonstrating that the odds of repeat homicide 
offenders are rare.176  Lastly, the myth that death sentences are cheaper than 
LWOP sentences has been debunked by the cost literature cited above.177 
One of the last remaining justifications for the death penalty in the 
modern era is a variant of retribution theory based on claims about 
“victims’ rights.”  According to this perspective, application of the death 
penalty demonstrates the state’s valuation of homicide victims and provides 
friends and family members with a sense of closure from their suffering.178  
 
170 See Baicker, supra note 32, at 3; Rupp, supra note 32, at 2754. 
171 See Gradess & Davies, supra note 55, at 397. 
172 Radelet, supra note 9, at 22–25. 
173 See Fagan & West, supra note 9, at 311; Richard Berk, New Claims About Executions 
and General Deterrence: Déjà Vu All Over Again?, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 303, 303 
(2005); John J. Donohue & Justin Wolfers, Uses and Abuses of Empirical Evidence in the 
Death Penalty Debate, 58 STAN. L. REV. 791, 794 (2005); Michael L. Radelet & Traci L. 
Lacock, Do Executions Lower Homicide Rates?: The Views of Leading Criminologists, 99 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 489, 489–90 (2009). 
174 See Fagan & West, supra note 9, at 315, 318–20; Donohue & Wolfers, supra note 
173. 
175 Radelet & Lacock, supra note 173, at 501. 
176 Radelet, supra note 9, at 23–24. 
177 Gradess & Davies, supra note 55, at 411. 
178 Radelet, supra note 9, at 32–33. 
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Although the psychological effects of executions on victims’ family 
members have not been thoroughly evaluated, some researchers argue that 
executions may further traumatize family members of homicide victims.179  
The emotionally protracted nature of capital cases often serves to 
“revictimize” family members of homicide victims.180 
Moreover, the noneconomic costs of the death penalty, especially to 
core values of justice, due process, and equal protection, have grown 
increasingly apparent as the “modern” death penalty has lumbered on.  
Systemic failures in ensuring the protection of capital defendants’ rights at 
the trial level are made evident by the exceptionally high rates of procedural 
error found in capital cases from across the country.181  Most dramatically, 
it has been discovered that a notable number of death penalty sentences 
have been imposed upon factually innocent citizens.182  Capital case 
outcomes in a number of death penalty states, including California, 
continue to reflect racially discriminatory patterns.183  And, as detailed 
above, death eligibility in many jurisdictions does not appear to be much 
narrower than it was prior to Furman, especially in states like California 
with broad capital statutes.184 
In light of the “executioner’s waning defenses,”185 coupled with these 
kinds of documented justice failures, many states have decided to abolish or 
fundamentally alter their capital punishment systems in order to redirect 
taxpayer dollars to alternative public-safety efforts.186  In 2007, then-New 
Jersey Governor Jon Corzine signed a measure invalidating the state’s death 
penalty system.187  In a similar vein, New Mexico Governor Bill 
 
179 See generally Mark D. Reed & Brenda Sims Blackwell, Secondary Victimization 
Among Families of Homicide Victims: The Impact of the Justice Process on Co-Victims’ 
Psychological Adjustment and Service Utilization, in WOUNDS THAT DO NOT BIND 253 
(2006); Margaret Vandiver, Capital Punishment and the Families of Victims and 
Defendants, in THE FUTURE OF AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY, supra note 9, at  379; Margaret 
Vandiver, The Impact of the Death Penalty on the Families of Homicide Victims and of 
Condemned Prisoners, in AMERICA’S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 
108, at 613. 
180 Reed & Blackwell, supra note 179, at 253–55, 259–61. 
181 See LIEBMAN ET AL., supra note 56, at ii. 
182 See FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER ET AL., THE DECLINE OF THE DEATH PENALTY AND THE 
DISCOVERY OF ACTUAL INNOCENCE 3 (2008); Lawrence C. Marshall, The Innocence 
Revolution and the Death Penalty, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 573, 576 (2004). 
183 See Mona Lynch & Craig Haney, Looking Across the Empathic Divide: Racialized 
Decision Making on the Capital Jury, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 573, 574; Pierce & Radelet, 
The Impact of Legally Inappropriate Factors, supra note 31, at 37. 
184 See Shatz, supra note 18, at 752. 
185 Radelet, supra note 9, at 19. 
186 See Alarcón & Mitchell, supra note 21, at S207. 
187 Id. at S208. 
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Richardson signed legislation to repeal the death penalty in 2009, citing 
financial concerns as a major rationale.  In 2011, Illinois abolished the death 
penalty, primarily because of the series of miscarriages of justice that had 
been uncovered in the state, and due to its discriminatory application.188  
The state has earmarked the cost savings for victim services and for law-
enforcement training.  Most recently, on April 25, 2012, Connecticut 
abolished its death penalty system largely in response to concerns over 
costs and wrongful convictions.189 
California is at a similar crossroads with regards to capital punishment. 
As the CCFAJ report highlighted, from a policy perspective, refusing to 
modify the current system is not a viable option.  Our findings suggest that 
the very existence of the death penalty as a charging option—as it is 
codified in the state—ensures significant financial, efficiency, and justice 
costs.  The discretion to file special circumstances in the vast majority of 
homicides makes for a very expensive tool in the prosecutorial arsenal that 
undoubtedly impacts resource allocations to public safety, crime 
prevention, and victim services.190  Indeed, Los Angeles County’s 
prosecutorial charging patterns suggest that only a small percentage of 
special circumstance cases are ultimately prosecuted capitally,191 but the 
time-costs begin to accrue as soon as those special circumstances are filed.  
In light of the tenuous empirical support for capital punishment as a public-
safety tool and the high costs it exacts on the state, it is difficult to imagine 
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